Livelihoods, Migration and Conflict:
Discussion of Findings from Two Studies in West and North Darfur, 2006 – 2007
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our thanks go first to the people of Kebkabiya and Zalingei who welcomed us, and willingly answered our many questions and took part in discussions. These studies would not have been possible without the support of local and international NGOs, including Kebkabiya Charitable Society, MercyCorps and Oxfam GB, who supported the two case-studies. Many researchers and research assistants contributed directly to this work, and we would especially like to thank Dr Abdaljabbar Fadul, Dr Babiker Badri, Anastasia Marshak, Elizabeth Bontrager, Joe Miskov and Emily Bruno. In the course of doing our fieldwork a wide range of organizations and individuals assisted us, far too many to mention, and to whom we are extremely grateful. We would like to thank the UK Department for International Development for funding this study, as part of the livelihoods research program of the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. We also thank the Mellon Foundation and the Ford Foundation, both of which funded parts of the study. Any mistakes and misrepresentations are entirely the authors’ responsibility.

Cover Photo: ‘Peace’ telecommunications service in West Darfur, Sudan. Photo by Helen Young.
Photo Left: Diego Fernandez

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SUMMARY

From 2006–2008, we researched the role played by migration and remittances in the livelihoods of conflict-affected people in Darfur, focusing on the changes and adaptations in two urban centers, between 2003 and the present. We conducted two case studies using surveys and qualitative research. The first was of the five IDP camps outside the town of Zalingei (West Darfur), and took place in November–December, 2006. The second was of both IDPs and residents in the town of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, in June 2007. This report is in two parts. The first part describes the background to the study, our methods, key findings and study implications. The second part sets out our two case studies in detail and includes two annexes: two chronology/time lines of the conflict in for each of the case-study locations, and a description of the training approach.

Our study’s main findings were as follows:

1. **The livelihood strategies of IDPs** in urban areas have undergone major shifts from their former rural-based farming systems to more urbanized lifestyles. This shift was a consequence of both conflict-induced displacement and the loss of mobility resulting from chronic insecurity in the region. After five years of displacement to urban areas (Zalingei and Kebkabiya) the IDP livelihood domain can be characterized as follows:
   - The livelihoods domain has expanded to incorporate multiple settings that span local urban, rural and transnational environments. Our research suggests that IDPs are caught in a transitional mode and that their livelihoods are increasingly multi-nodal.
   - IDPs pursue semi-urbanized livelihood strategies that are inadequate, insecure and maladaptive. Most are relatively marginal and do not contribute sufficient food and income. Some strategies are not sustainable, including over-exploitation of borehole water for brick-making or resale. Some livelihood strategies expose people to intimidation, harassment, looting or violence as when IDPs attempt to collect firewood or other natural resources. In our survey, insecurity was the reason given for not cultivating by 82% of IDPs in Kebkabiya, and by 85% of IDPs in Zalingei.
   - The presence of the international humanitarian community generates multiplier and distorting effects both on IDP livelihood strategies and on processes of urbanization, economic growth and environmental change in Darfur. The local and regional economic impact of international humanitarian programs and the UNAMID peace-keeping operations have included local employment generation, increased demand for property, rentals and construction boom, and the demand for imported luxury goods.

2. **Darfur’s economic reliance on migration and remittance transfers** was devastated by the 2003 conflict, but local systems have adapted, especially in the expanding urban centers. These adaptations include:
   - An increased volume and flow of remittances to IDP populations.
Although IDPs are reticent to disclose remittance amounts, financial intermediaries, traders and banks in Darfur confirm this increase.

- Remittance transfer mechanisms have shifted from the previous trade-based hawala system to a more cash-based one, with an increase in the number of financial intermediaries in the main towns. In some areas *thuraya* satellite phones and mobile phones are used to transmit remittances.

- Hand-carried messages and remittances, and the use of postal services for communications between remittance receivers and senders have declined, while phone centers and use of mobile phones have greatly increased in importance.

These findings have implications for three commonly asked questions:

*Will IDPs return to their rural homes?*
Given the transitional and ‘multi-nodal’ nature of their urbanized livelihoods, IDPs will almost certainly not return directly to their rural homes. We think it more likely that IDPs will continue to foster their increasingly urbanized and transnational livelihoods.

*How can a wider range of livelihood strategies be supported?*

*Should remittances be supported and in what ways?*

The ‘multi-nodal’ livelihoods environment broadens the potential arena for policy and program intervention. Efforts to promote and support urban livelihoods in Darfur, must consider the potential ‘maladaptations’ that are taking place, particularly in terms of over-exploitation of limited natural resources, including water and potentially timber. While earlier studies indicated that remittance flows should be facilitated by humanitarian agencies, our study suggests more attention to issues of protection, and the security of remittance senders and receivers.
In conflict zones where displacement and insecurity undermine people’s ability to pursue livelihoods, links with the diaspora, particularly the remittances they send, are an important source of support. But displacement and insecurity obstruct existing remittance channels, and it is thought that remittance receipts tend to decline after displacement even as they assume relatively greater importance in supporting livelihoods. Primary research on the change in remittance patterns before and after displacement is difficult to conduct, and there are very few studies that have explored this important livelihood dynamic. From 2006–2008, we conducted research exploring the role played by migration and remittances in the livelihoods of conflict-affected people in Darfur, focusing on the changes and adaptations between 2003 and the present. We conducted two case studies using surveys and qualitative research. One was of the five IDP camps outside the town of Zalingei (West Darfur), and the other was of mixed IDPs and residents in the town of Kebkabiya in North Darfur. This report is in two parts. The first part describes the background to the study, our methods, key findings and study implications. The second part sets out our two case studies in detail and includes two annexes: two chronology/time lines of the conflict in for each of the case-study locations, and a description of the training approach.

In the Darfur region livelihood systems are closely linked with migration. Rural production systems are predominantly based on sedentary cultivation (farming) or transhumant pastoralism, but households also diversify their livelihood strategies to exploit opportunities within the region and in more distant countries. These strategies include trade, seasonal employment, longer-term labour opportunities linked with remittance transfers, and the long-distance livestock migration of pastoralists. Household mobility has also enabled adaptation to climate variability, when core activities came under ecological pressures of drought. In the early seventies and mid eighties, extreme drought and famine led to the southward migration of agro-pastoralists, and displaced people seeking relief settled spontaneously in camps bordering the main towns. Following these famine years, an increasing number of migrant households settled permanently in the southern part of North Darfur and also in South Darfur. Mobility is therefore an integral part of peoples’ lives, and their livelihoods domain extends across regional and national boundaries. This transnational dimension means the people of Darfur are subject to the national, regional and global economic and political forces, as well as the conditions in their immediate locality.

The conflict and crisis in Darfur has had an unprecedented impact on migration and mobility, restricting and blocking physical movement of people and livestock with dire consequences for livelihoods. An earlier study by Tufts/FIC showed that forced displacement and restricted mobility directly contributed to the failure of livelihood strategies and loss of assets, including: “production failures, market failures, failures to access natural resources, and failure to transmit back remittances”. The importance of mobility has been confirmed by subsequent studies (Young, Osman, and Dale, 2007; Young, Osman, and Dale, 2007; Buchanan Smith and Jaspars, 2007; Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2008).

**Introduction**

There is now a burgeoning literature on remittances, with growing controversies about their impact on development both at the household and community levels. On the one hand it is argued that remittance income supports poor households by enabling increased consumption (housing, food, health care and education) and possibly providing for debt repayment. Remittance flows also promote local investment, trade relations, and the development of new knowledge and innovations, attitudes and information.1

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In Sudan, research on remittances reveals the importance of unrecorded remittances as a proportion of GNP dating back to the eighties. On the other hand, some argue that remittances divert development funds, promote the ‘wrong’ kind of investment, increase community inequality and tensions, and create major problems for those obliged to send remittances.

The literature suggests that during conflict and displacement both the scale and scope of remittance flows change, and their importance to the household changes. Gammeltoft suggests that in conflict situations remittance inflows are likely to be smaller but assume a relatively greater importance in supporting livelihoods relative to stable economies (Gammeltoft, 2002). Evidence from refugee camps suggests that access to remittances is one of the most significant economic resources for refugee households, and over time, the importance of this resource increases as humanitarian assistance declines (Horst, 2004, 2006).

In conflict zones the flow of remittances changes, as traditional patterns of migration and sending mechanisms are disrupted, and new means must be found. Remittances become a resource that can be re-directed or stolen so as to support war economies or the continuation of the conflict. Far-flung diasporas become engaged in the conflict in different ways, and new forms of social and political capital flow back to the receiving country, with ideas and practices that can have both positive and negative consequences for conflict-affected communities. The evolution of the conflict itself can be affected by diasporas and the resources they send; they can fuel conflicts, or assist with recovery. Eritrea and Northern Ireland are well-documented examples of countries where diasporas influenced the continuation of the conflict. Today the diasporas of countries like Liberia, Iraq and Afghanistan appear to play similar roles, but have also enabled the influx of significant amounts of humanitarian assistance (Fagen and Bump, 2005; Savage and Harvey, 2007; Young, Osman, and Dale, 2007). However, the ways in which remittances affect conflict dynamics or regional power relations is still at the hypothetical stage, since empirical research is sparse and in-depth field studies virtually non-existent.

Background to the Post-2003 Displacement in Darfur

Since the conflict intensified in Darfur in 2003, the pattern of conflict, level of protection threats, and numbers of conflict affected and displaced (as recognized by the humanitarian community) have evolved and changed. The worst of the counter-insurgency took place from mid 2003 to early 2004, and so coincided with most of the forced displacement. Villages were attacked, homesteads looted, burned and destroyed. Civilians fled for their lives, seeking safety by hiding out in nearby hills and wadi’s (seasonal riverbed), some crossing the border into Chad, and others wandering within Darfur in search of refuge and safety. After several weeks in transit many arrived in towns or the nearby camps of displaced people. Atrocities were committed by both sides of the conflict, although the scale of the counter-insurgency was unprecedented.

By July 2004 there were 1.1 million displaced people in the larger towns of Darfur, and more than 100,000 refugees in the camps in neighboring Chad. The numbers of displaced continued to increase through 2004 into 2005, as a consequence both of direct attacks, and the localized insecurity and loss of livelihoods which made it untenable for people to survive in their home rural areas. With time, humanitarian capacities increased and by the end of 2005 the numbers of displaced were approximately 1.6 million out of a total of 3.25 million conflict-affected people.

The conflict-affected population of Darfur includes IDPs in camp settings, IDPs in mixed IDP/host communities (rural and urban), and rural and urban (non-displaced) residents

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(according to the classification of the UN World Food Programme). Our study sites are examples of two of these groupings. Kebkabiya represents an urban mixed IDP/host community, and Zalingei represents IDPs in camp settings. Zalingei and Kebkabiya represent politicized contexts, with direct links to the ongoing conflict. Zalingei is one of several ‘highly politicised’ large IDP populations located close to the state capital or large urban centers (e.g. Nyala, El Fasher, El Geneina).

The Strategic Importance of the Study Sites: Kebkabiya and Zalingei

Kebkabiya and Zalingei are urban centers and sites of major displacement in Darfur. Each represents a strategically important locus of the Darfur conflict. Since the 1980s both regions have experienced inter-tribal conflict between the sedentarized farmers and livestock herding groups. Zalingei is located in the east of West Darfur State and Kebkabiya is in the south of North Darfur State (Map A). Each is the capital of a locality (mahaliya), one administrative level below the State, and is governed by a Commissioner. Both sites are situated in the relatively fertile ‘central cultivating zone’ of Darfur, characterized by good rainfall and fertile alluvial soils. Both are in the traditional heartland of the Fur, the original homelands or ‘dar’ of the Fur tribe. Important livestock migration routes traverse the region. During the native administration, livestock movement was well organized and administered, but conflicts began to emerge first between the sedentary Fur and the livestock herding Bedeyat and Zaghawa, and then with the camel-herding Arab groups in the eighties (Young et al., 2009). Inter-tribal reconciliation efforts and conferences agreed compensations and blood money, but these were only partly paid and tensions and violent disputes continued, including burning of villages.

The areas surrounding Kebkabiya and Zalingei were directly affected by the Government-backed counter-insurgency starting in 2003. Entire localities to the east of Kebkabiya, including Jebel Si were emptied out. Around Zalingei, the predominantly Fur farming population were also driven out of their villages and into the IDP camps of Zalingei.

Zalingei is also strategically important because it was home to some of the leading figures in the rebel movement, including Abdalwahid al Nur, leader of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, who was born and raised in Zalingei. Other prominent Fur are also from this region, including Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige, former governor (and first Fur governor) of Darfur (1981-1983) and leader of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, and also rotating head of the now defunct National Redemption Front (an alliance of rebel groups that emerged after the partial signing of the DPA). The families of Ahmed Direige and other political figures in the rebel movement (Ahmed Abdel-Shafi) are living in Hassa Hissa camp in Zalingei, and it has become a ‘closed camp’ meaning that people cannot leave and it is not officially open to government or even the African Union. Many of the IDPs have close contacts with the rebel movements as well as their diaspora overseas. Four camps are centers of rebel support and they mounted violent protests in the days following the partial signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Since 2006 there have been a spate of assassinations and attempted assassinations of tribal leaders in the camps. A recent 2008 news report states that “11 tribal sheikhs around Zalingei, have been killed since the beginning of 2007” (MacFarquhar, 2008). The cases remain unsolved and suspicions vary from suspecting that the government is behind them to suspecting that new pro-rebel youth groups are responsible. The camps of Zalingei are clearly highly politicized.

Both Zalingei and Kebkabiya are located relatively close to the upland area of Jebel Marra, a rebel stronghold (south of Kebkabiya and east of Zalingei) which also contributes to their strategic importance. In 2006 Kebkabiya had a large African Union contingent posted on the outskirts of the town.
prior to the fieldwork. All interviews required the informed oral consent of the interviewees. Field data collection is particularly challenging in the Darfur context, and to ensure access to the conflict-affected communities we worked with known and trusted research partners – local and international NGOs that worked in the areas and were known to the IDPs. In Zalingei, Mercy-Corps hosted and supported the survey, and in Kebkabiya, Oxfam GB and the Kebkabiya Charitable Society (KCS) supported us. Our partners’ local knowledge enabled us to do the following:

1. Obtain registration lists
2. Adapt our research tools (questionnaire and sampling strategy) to the local context
3. In Zalingei, gain insight into the dynamics of the different IDP camp communities and be introduced to the leaders. This enabled access to our target communities that would otherwise have been difficult to reach,
4. Carry out the surveys by providing enumerators who were known to our target communities.

Our partners were implementing humanitarian programmes and therefore had a direct interest in our research findings, as well as in learning more about livelihoods assessment approaches and developing related skills.

In each study site, we began with several days of consultation with our partner NGOs, key informants and community leaders to communicate the goals of our research and secure their cooperation. The politicized nature of the conflict and displacement, particularly in Zalingei, necessitated a long process of meetings and negotiations to gain the consent of local IDP leaders. This process continued throughout the survey, and access to the Hamadiya was only secured towards the end of the survey. These discussions benefited from the support of Mercy Corps staff who had good relations in the camps. The tense environment in Zalingei required close supervision of the
enumerators and constant liaison with camp leaders. For the Zalingei enumerators we chose IDP teachers who were living in the camps with their families. They facilitated interviewing in local languages and helped in overcoming the reluctance of IDPs to talk to outsiders.

In Kebkabiya, KCS organized meetings with the IDPs and host community leaders. The process of securing consent was smooth compared to Zalingei, although tensions increased as the local government authorities began planning the census and re-planning the town. Enumerators were drawn from the KCS field-staff, many of whom were familiar with assessment procedures and participatory approaches.

In each site we adapted the questionnaire to local conditions, and tested it as part of the training of enumerators. During the survey, we conducted the key informant interviews and focus groups that comprised our qualitative research. We conducted focus group discussions with our enumerators to explore their views on the progress of the survey and the respondents’ attitudes.

The survey interviews were entered into Excel spread sheets, and the data files and paper interviews were sent to the FIC in Boston. The qualitative data were written up as field notes on a daily basis, and then transcribed into NVivo for coding and analysis. In Boston the survey data were further translated from Arabic where necessary, cleaned and then analyzed using SPSS and Stata. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, analysis of variance and regressions. For details, see each case study’s methodological approach.

**Sampling**

Registration of IDPs and conflict affected people in Darfur has always been linked with the registration for different types of humanitarian assistance. For this reason, different agencies use different lists and figures for the same camp or IDP area. Registration for food assistance has been standardized by WFP/IOM/HAC since 2005, when the entire affected population was re-registered and all households received ration cards. However this re-registration exercise provoked violent demonstrations by some IDPs and the Zalingei camps were temporarily closed. As of the time of our surveys, there had been no updating of the food distribution lists since 2005 in either Zalingei or Kebkabiya. INGOs working in other sectors often develop their own programme registration lists, and we used those of our partner organizations in each study site. In Zalingei, we used IDP household lists that were assembled for MercyCorps’s Water and Sanitation program. These lists were updated regularly by MercyCorps staff who made daily visits to the camps and maintained good information. In Kebkabiya, we used the household lists assembled by KCS.

A key objective of our study was to understand remittance patterns and we needed to ensure that our survey sample contained sufficient remittance receivers. We therefore used an approach known as ‘adaptive’ sampling, which is based on generating an initial random sample, and then using link tracing to develop a second stage sample weighted towards the desired group of respondents (in our case, remittance receivers). Together, the random sample and link-traced sample can be used to construct a sampling frame from which estimates can be obtained. Our efforts to create an additional sample of remittance receivers was only partially successful, as not all the people to whom we were referred said they were receiving remittances. In order to analyze remittance patterns, we combined remittance receivers from both the random and the adaptive samples.

For the qualitative research, we used purposive sampling to generate focus groups and key informants from particular groups, including tribal leaders, communities from particular areas of origin, those pursuing particular livelihood strategies (such as pastoralists, migrants or farmers), wealth groups, and so forth.

**Training**

We conducted a three-day training in each location for enumerators. In Zalingei the enumerators were IDP primary school teachers living in the camps. In Kebkabiya we trained 19 enumerators; six from Oxfam, eleven from KCS and two from the Ministry of Agriculture. The training included exercises in participatory analysis, which integrated livelihoods, conflict analysis and protection, and also the piloting of the questionnaire tool.
Methodological challenges

Our efforts to conduct primary data collection encountered a number of challenges and limitations, with consequences for the validity of our findings and our confidence in them. These challenges manifested themselves differently in both settings, but were basically of two kinds.

First, the heavily politicized setting, particularly of the Zalingei camps, obstructed our access to the camps and the conduct of the survey. Second, given the experience of violent conflict and forced displacement the IDPs had undergone and their continuing insecurity in the camps, some of the questions we asked elicited guarded or incomplete responses.

Box 1. Timeline for the Studies, Insecurity and Bureaucratic Impediments

The timeline for the implementation of these studies, including the preparatory work is shown below. Three household surveys were planned but only two were completed because fieldwork was seriously impeded by the bureaucracy of travel permits and severe local security constraints. On the last day of the survey in Kebkabiya, the offices of our local partner the Kebkabiya Charitable Society were raided the deputy director locked up and the director was abducted and abandoned far from the town.

Twice Helen Young and Karen Jacobsen were prevented from travelling to Darfur, and once Helen Young had to leave El Fasher on the request of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission. These bureaucratic obstacles are common in Darfur, and not associated with this research per se. This did however seriously delay the research work, and incurred considerable extra costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>An initial survey instrument was developed and tested among a small sample of Darfuri IDPs in Omdurman, Khartoum. The researchers Helen Young and Karen Jacobsen were prevented from travelling to Darfur to pilot the survey instrument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July/August, 2006</td>
<td>Exploratory visit to Zalingei, West Darfur by Tufts researcher Abdal Monium Osman. The plan had been to undertake a pilot study in Mukjar, West Darfur, however, as a result of violence erupting in many of the IDP camps along the Umm Dokhun to Zalingei corridor this was not possible. (security restricted the researchers movements and so prevented him conducting the pilot survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 2006</td>
<td>First household survey in Zalingei, West Darfur. Helen Young and Karen Jacobsen were once more prevented from travelling to West Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 2007</td>
<td>Second household survey in Kebkabiya, North Darfur with Oxfam GB and the Kebkabiya Charitable Smallholders Society, with Helen Young and Abdal Monium Osman. Raid on KSCS which prevented the last day of the survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 2007</td>
<td>Third household survey planned for Kutum, North Darfur, but Helen Young was prevented from travelling to Kutum from El Fasher, and asked to return to Khartoum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
was linked with the politicized claims of the rebel groups, which incorporated a narrative that it was dangerous or politically unwise to travel or move about outside of the camps because of the threat of gender based violence or the presence of antagonistic groups. Therefore, to sustain this narrative our respondents might have been reluctant to reveal their household’s movements. In Zalingei over ninety percent said no-one from their household had left the camps. Yet half of respondents (50%) had one or more family members away at the time of the survey. Conflicting responses like this suggest they were calculated and throw some doubt on their validity.

The whereabouts of male household members (husbands, sons, relatives) who might either be away securing a livelihood, or being a combatant or both, was another sensitive question. Again, respondents might have felt that revealing this information would jeopardize their IDP status and entitlement to humanitarian aid. This reluctance on the part of IDPs to reveal the whereabouts of family members could explain why in Kebkabiya IDPs were much more likely than residents to say that no members of their household were away (64% compared with just 9.5% of residents). More than half of the residents (59%) reported one member away, compared with 20% of IDPs.

**Translation**

Another challenge for our research was the need for translation from Arabic to English (and even from Fur to Arabic to English) at all levels of the research design, from initial training through the survey and focus groups to cleaning the data. With this many layers there were many opportunities for misinformation and obfuscation.

**Security clearance problems**

The data were gathered in Darfur, then analyzed in Boston without the opportunity to check inconsistencies or unclear results. As reported in Box 1, two of the senior researchers (Young and Jacobsen) were blocked twice from going to Darfur when the government refused to issue security clearances, and on one occasion, Helen Young was forced to return to Khartoum shortly after arriving in Darfur. These administrative obstacles meant our data could not be thoroughly checked in a timely fashion.
Our study’s key findings are in three main areas: livelihood shifts and adaptations after displacement linked with urbanization, the link between migration and conflict, and the role of remittances in post-displacement livelihoods.

Our study confirmed that the livelihood strategies of IDPs have changed to reflect the shift from their former rural-based farming systems to their new, urbanized environments. Initially, conflict and insecurity contributed to loss of mobility and displacement, which severely constrained Darfuris’ ability to engage in traditional livelihood strategies of cultivation, herding, collection of natural resources, trade and labour migration. After five years of displacement to urban areas, the IDP livelihood domain can be characterized as follows:

1. The transition from predominantly rural farming has led to semi–urbanized livelihood strategies that are inadequate, insecure and or maladaptive.
2. The livelihoods domain has expanded to incorporate multiple settings that span local urban, rural and the wider transnational environments. IDPs are caught in a transitional mode and that their livelihoods are increasingly multi-nodal.
3. The presence of the international humanitarian community and resources generates multiplier and distorting effects both on IDP livelihood strategies and on wider processes of urbanization, economic growth and environmental change in Darfur.

**Loss of Livelihoods - Conflict Driving Migration and Displacement**

Our earlier research in Darfur confirmed how conflict and peoples’ livelihoods are inextricably linked. Livelihoods are interwoven with the underlying causes of the conflict, and as the conflict has played out over the past five years it has severely affected the livelihoods of all groups, both directly through systematic destruction and indirectly by more systemic erosive processes. The counter-insurgency and attacks on villages in 2003, destroyed livelihoods through the systematic destruction and associated asset-stripping. Conversely, the lack of mobility and access as a result of insecurity caused the systemic erosion of livelihoods eventually resulting in displacement. Following their displacement to Kebkabiya and Zalingei, it was all but impossible to resume their former livelihood strategies because of their restricted mobility and lack of access to farmland or natural resources.

**Clustered migration and conflict**

Our data for Kebkabiya show the spatial and temporal distribution of the displacement before and during 2003. As shown by the maps at right, the clustered migration from areas of origin in 2003 (Figure 1) suggest migration to Kebkabiya was linked to, even triggered by the counter-insurgency campaign that targeted civilian areas. The pattern of clustering possibly indicates a community-level response to direct attacks, or to fear of attack. This contrasts with the areas of origin of those who left during all other times (pre- and post-2003), which are more widely and evenly dispersed (Figure 2).

In other areas of Darfur, patterns of migration and displacement are more varied suggesting migration was driven not only by direct attacks, but also by fear of attack and increasing vulnerability resulting from the obstruction of livelihood strategies and erosion of livelihood assets (i.e. the systematic or indirect destruction of livelihoods).

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4 This early analysis of “livelihoods under siege” was confirmed in a subsequent 2005 study on livelihoods (Buchanan Smith and Jaspars, 2007) and also in a series of Darfur workshops that applied a participatory approach to livelihoods analysis of all livelihood groups (Young et al., 2007)

5 This disruption of mobility is a widespread phenomenon in urban conflict displacement, and has been documented in such conflict zones as Casamance, Senegal, and Mozambique. (Evans, 2007)
Figure 1: Household Origins, Migration During Periods of High Conflict

Origin Density of Households Migrating to Kebkabiya, High Conflict Periods

Figure 2: Household Origins, Migration During All Other Times

Origin Density of Households Migrating to Kebkabiya, Low Conflict Periods

(Both maps courtesy of Bontrager and Miskov 2008)

Widespread insecurity undermined people’s ability to move around, which is crucial for livelihoods built on agriculture and raising livestock. In the new IDP settings, farming is almost completely prevented by limited access to land, protection threats and general lack of security. At the time of the survey only 7% of IDPs had cultivated “this year” because of the security situation and the distance of their farms from Kebkabiya. Insecurity was the reason given for not cultivating by 82% of IDPs in Kebkabiya, and by 85% of IDPs in Zalingei. Interestingly, land occupation by others was only given as the reason for not cultivating by eight percent in Zalingei, and 4% in Kebkabiya.

There was also a dramatic decline in livestock ownership linked to the conflict for both IDPs and residents in Kebkabiya, but especially IDPs. Before 2003, residents were much less likely to own livestock than IDPs: 16% of residents owned no livestock versus only one percent of IDPs. This difference is expected given that the IDPs were largely rural and residents more urban. This pattern shifted in 2007, when more residents owned livestock than IDPs; over 90 percent of IDPs owned no livestock compared with 76% of residents. In Zalingei these shifts in livestock ownership were similar. In both cases the main reason for loss of livestock was raiding, cited by both IDPs (92%) and residents (56%) in Kebkabiya.

Market and trade systems were also seriously affected by insecurity and limited mobility. A study in 2008 found that trade in locally produced grain had all but collapsed both because farmers had become displaced and because of the difficulties of transporting grain from traditional surplus producing areas to the major markets (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). To some extent, the food aid programme has protected the cereal market as many traders have switched from trading local grain to trading food aid. This has prevented many traders from going out of business and has lowered and stabilized prices for the benefit of all groups.

Maladaptive Shifts in Livelihood Strategies and the Expanding Livelihoods Domain

IDPs have shifted from agriculturally based livelihoods to more diversified urban livelihoods based on less secure sources of food and income. Between Zalingei and Kebkabiya there were important differences in the development of new livelihood strategies. In Kebkabiya more than 43 percent engaged in casual daily labour, while only three percent did so in Zalingei. We attribute this difference to their local setting: IDPs in Zalingei are relatively confined to camps, while the IDPs in Kebkabiya live in the town and are more integrated with the host community.

The diversification of strategies pursued by IDPs do not add up to an adequate livelihood or source of food security or income, because of the massive increase in the urban population with large numbers of IDPs chasing the same limited opportunities. Most IDPs continue to depend on food assistance, which despite 50% ration cuts in May 2008, continue to comprise a significant share of their food sources. Many of the new strategies involve protection threats, or, like daily casual labour, are short-term, or limited, as in the case of food aid where rations can be cut by half over-night (Young, 2007).

IDPs who leave the camps to collect firewood or to try to cultivate potentially risk intimidation, harassment, looting or violence. The collection of firewood by IDP women is widely associated with gender based violence, specifically rape. However, not all our IDP respondents faced this security risk. For example, the Hottiya IDPs of Taiba camp in Zalingei are Arabs and they were able to collect firewood without risk. IDP women buy firewood from Arab groups and then re-sell this wood inside the camps which are closed to outsiders i.e. the Arab groups. The livelihood links between perpetrators of GBV and their victims are often overlooked by outsiders.

Some of the new strategies adopted by IDPs, such as the sale of firewood, water-selling and brick-making, are unsustainable either because


8 A report by UNMIS stated that “On the 9 September thirty women from Hamadiya IDP camp in Zalingei went to gather firewood just six kilometers north of Zalingei. The group of women was intercepted by Arab militia and they were arrested and detained for several hours. Reportedly they were beaten and threatened by the militia. The threats were that the women should refrain from gathering firewood” (UNMIS, 2007). However we do not have data from our own study or from other studies about the extent of gender based violence affecting women leaving the camps.
they over-exploit limited natural resources in a fragile ecosystem, or because they are linked to markets distorted by the conflict, the presence of the international community and large scale of displacement. Firewood collection puts considerable pressure on natural resources in areas around IDP camps, which have been reportedly cleared of tree cover for many kilometres. Borehole water, provided for humanitarian purposes, is often collected and sold to urban residents, thereby exhausting a limited resource.9 The massive food assistance programme has similarly affected market supply and prices of cereal grains (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). Pastoralist groups in particular have benefitted from the widely available and relatively cheaper food aid sorghum, which has become a regular source of fodder for horses in particular.10

The construction boom, which is linked with the increasing scale of the international interventions in Darfur and the demand for housing from residents and IDPs, is driving brick-making, another new livelihood strategy available to IDPs. However, researchers have concluded that: “The environmental consequences are devastating. Rough estimates indicate that the brick kilns are consuming over 52,000 trees-worth of wood per year; and since the conflict began much of this is green wood. The brick kilns are occupying and in many cases destroying valuable agricultural land by digging up clay soils around towns” (UNEP, 2008).

In this fragile economy, fractured by its links with coercion and violence and where the natural environment is over-exploited with few if any controls, livelihoods are extremely precarious and very few IDP livelihood strategies could be considered secure or sustainable in the longer-term.

The Distorting Effects of the International Community on the Local Economy and Environment

The international humanitarian programmes and UNAMID peace-keeping operations have had a significant impact on the local and regional economy, including local employment generation and linked multiplier effects. There has been increased demand for imported luxury goods and for property (for example, rentals by aid agencies), a construction boom, and a growing black market in looted humanitarian assets, especially vehicles and thuraya (satellite) phones.11

One multiplier effect resulting from the injection of cash and other assets into the Darfur economy by the international humanitarian community is increased aggregate demand. More jobs have generated more spending and net transfers to a wider group of people. The demand for imported luxuries by expatriate groups, unlike spending on locally produced goods, does not boost Darfur’s economy but rather stimulates imports and financial transfers out of Darfur. Interviews with bank personnel indicate a net growth in outgoing transfers from Darfur to Khartoum or outside of Sudan since late 2007 to 2008. Our banker informants linked this increase to demand for specific products associated with the international community, including luxury goods and fruits desired by international humanitarian agencies and peace-keeping forces. One El Fasher bank indicated that daily in-transfers of goods had increased by 344% (from 45 in 2003 to 155 in 2008), while the outgoing transfers had increased by 366% (from 60 in 2003 to 220 in 2008) (Fadul, 2008).

9 An Oxfam study of water usage by IDPs in Al Fashir in 2007 found that “on average less than 50% of water collected is prioritised for health & domestic activities and communities overwhelmingly prioritise water usage for livelihood, income generating and shelter activities. This has effectively led to a doubling in the rate of water consumption” (Oxfam GB, 2007).

10 This was evident during the fieldwork for the study on pastoralism by Young, Osman et al., 2009.

11 Regular well-paid salaries to a growing and significant group of professional national aid workers has had a multiplier effect both in terms of the expenditure patterns of these individuals and also the wider networks than each employed individual supports. Their presence has influenced demand for local properties, property rentals, building, and availability of local building materials (timber, bricks, water etc) (UNEP, 2008) and created a demand for luxury imported goods including bottled water, fruit, processed foods and locally produced goods including fresh meat, fresh fruit and vegetables, and milk (processed foods are not produced within Darfur).
Transnational Livelihoods: Dynamic and Temporary

The livelihoods domain of both IDPs and residents in Darfur extends into neighboring countries and in some cases to the distant diaspora in Europe and the US. In Zalingei for example, half of our respondents had one or more family members (usually men) away at the time of the survey. Even in the context of restricted access and limited mobility, IDPs have been able to maintain their transnational livelihoods and retained a degree of flexibility in their livelihood patterns.

An important livelihood strategy in Darfur has been the migration of workers for the purposes of sending back remittances (discussed further below). Our study found that there were significant shifts in who were receiving remittances after 2003. In Kebkabiya just 29 IDP households received remittances both before 2003 and at the time of the survey (2007), while an additional 52 households were receiving remittances in 2007, indicating this was a new source of income for them. It is important to note that remittance receipts are temporary, and can only be sustained as long as the household's migrant worker remains in place and continues to remit. This is rarely a permanent arrangement. In Kebkabiya, the most common reason given for why remittances were no longer received was that the sender had returned to Kebkabiya.

Even though IDP livelihoods are severely constrained in the current context of displacement and insecurity, there is some mobility of IDP household members, particularly young males, some of whom left and later returned to their displaced households in Darfur. Absent household members were excluded from the re-registration for the general rations in 2005 and thus did not receive a ration entitlement, and household food rations have to be shared with them. Little or no information was available about absent men who were combatants, and this was never mentioned by our respondents. In Zalingei there was a difference in absent males between camps, with the predominantly Arab camp of Tarba having a disproportionately higher percentage of 18 to 25 years old males (44%), as compared to the total sample (18%), which may be a result of this group of Arabs not being strongly politically aligned to a combatant group.

Changes in Remittance Flows and Migration

The rebel insurgency and government counter-insurgency of 2003 and early 2004 and the closure of the Sudan–Libyan border in May 2003 severely disrupted migration and livestock trade between Libya and central Sudan and Darfur, and the flow of hand-carried remittances dwindled dramatically (Young, Osman, and Dale, 2007). Lost income from workers in Libya was conservatively estimated at US$15 million per annum. Darfuri migrant communities in Eastern Sudan were similarly affected by difficulties in hand-carrying remittances and communicating with their displaced relatives in Darfur. Our surveys of 2006 and 2007 in Zalingei and Kebkabiya occurred 30 months after the initial displacement and would have allowed time for adaptations to have taken place. By then, remittances were one of the few remaining livelihood strategies, but available only to those with relatives in the Darfuri diaspora. Pressure on the diaspora to remit had increased. We found three main changes, discussed further below:

- an increase in the number of remittance receiving households in Kebkabiya (also reported by banks and hawaldar);
- the development of alternative remitting mechanisms, particularly a shift from the trade-based hawahla system to a more cash based one; an increase in the number of financial intermediaries in the main towns; and
- an increase in the importance of mobile phones, phone centers and thuraya (satellite) phones for communications between senders and receivers and for sending remittances.

There appeared to be no change in the utilization of remittances, which continue to be used for basic consumption needs. We did find a significant relationship between owning livestock and receiving remittances in 2007, which suggests the possibility that livestock remain an investment strategy for households with income to invest. However, we could not explore this pattern, and further research is needed.
Remittance Adaptation 1: Increase in Remittance Flows Since Before 2003

In Kebkabiya, more households reported receiving remittances in 2007 than before 2003. Numbers of both residents and IDP receivers increased by about six percent; from 18.5% to 24.6% for IDPs, and from 15.3% to 21.2% for residents. By contrast in Zalingei, less than five percent of households reported receiving remittances, and there was no significant difference between 2003 and in 2005. This difference between Zalingei and Kebkabiya is partly explained by dominant livelihood systems in place. The Kutum–Kebkabiya–Jebel Si area is an ‘agro-migrant zone’ where migration was an essential source of income in part because of the more marginal nature of crop production (Save UK DFIS, 2004). Zalingei falls within the western Jebel Mara lowland where mixed farming predominates.

Proximity to migrant destinations and ease of migrant travel also account for this difference. Kebkabiya is closer to Libya, and established migrant routes go directly through North Darfur or indirectly from Tina then through Chad to Libya. In both Zalingei and Kebkabiya, Libya was identified most frequently as the location of remitters, although households reported more absent family members in Khartoum than in Libya. Remittance senders are predominantly relatives indicating the importance of family linkages between receiving and sending communities.

Some of the differences in reported remittance receiving between Kebkabiya and Zalingei may be a function of the research process and the different political contexts of the two study sites. We surmise that Zalingei respondents were more unwilling to report remittances because four of the Zalingei camps were highly politicized, with widespread suspicions among IDPs of potential infiltrators within their communities. At the time of the survey the camps were tense, and had recently experienced assassinations of tribal leaders, killing of relief workers, closure of the camps and withdrawal of the African Union and international community. This certainly influenced the reporting of sensitive subjects such as remittance receipts. In Kebkabiya, IDPs were more integrated within the host community, the divisions between them and the host population were less obvious, and the situation was less politically charged.

Interviews with banks and financial intermediaries (hawaldar) in El Fasher and Kebkabiya confirm our survey finding that remittance flows have increased over time (Fadul, 2008). One hawaldar explained that before 2003 they used to handle a smaller number of remittances but each would be much larger: roughly 30 to 35 remittances transfers of between 10,000 to 15,000 SDG ($5000 to $7500) per month. Such large transfers, he explained, were intended mainly for building houses or for commercial or trading purposes. In 2007, this same agency was receiving up to 900 remittance transfers per month (30 to 35 per day) specifically for IDPs with an average amount ranging between 200 SDG and 600SDP ($100 to $300), which means on an annual basis this hawaldar is handling between $90,000 to $270,000 of remittances to IDPs in El Fasher (Fadul, 2008). This gives an illustration of the increasing importance and scale of remittance flows to IDPs, although the total value of remittances sent to Darfur through Hawaldars is very difficult to estimate from this patchy data, as there are many unknowns.

Remittance Adaptations 2: Remittance Transfer Mechanisms

Remittance transfer mechanisms have shifted from the previous common practice of hand-carried remittances and the trade-based hawala system direct from both Omdurman and Kufra in Libya, to a cash-based hawala system or the use of banks, with a large increase in the numbers of financial intermediaries in the main towns. In some areas thuraya satellite phones and mobile phones are used to transmit remittances.

The hawala system has grown and is now handling larger numbers of remittances with higher total monetary values. Compared with hand-carried remittances, senders incur higher charges but the financial systems in place mean risk is lower.

An interesting adaptation by IDPs is their use of guarantors to help them access their resources through hawaldars (financial intermediaries) or banks. The guarantor is needed as the IDPs, especially women, as they often lack the necessary documents such as an identity card, nationality card or passport.
The number of Sudanese bank account holders has rapidly expanded, and branches are found in all the main towns. Many provincial bank branches closed in 2004 as a result of the conflict but have re-opened and are flourishing. In Al Fashir the banks continued to function throughout the conflict and currently there are seven different banks with reportedly increasing numbers of bank account holders, including both savings and current accounts. One El Fashir bank for example has seen a growth in current accounts by 468% and in saving accounts by 633%. This may be linked with the increase in regular employment and income generation associated with international humanitarian response and peace-keeping operations, and also the multiplier effect mentioned above. But also it is likely to be connected with the increased security threats of looting, raids and theft if cash is kept at home. Many traders were reportedly robbed of significant sums of capital in 2003 and 2004.

While the rate of remittance transfers through banks increased from 2004 to 2006, these did not necessarily go to IDPs as they would not have had the necessary papers and banks do not have the same flexibility of using an IDP guarantor. However some Darfuri traders have used their own bank accounts to assist absent members of their communities to transfer remittances to IDPs.

Remittance Adaptation 3: Communications

Hand-carried messages and hand-carried remittances have declined significantly, while phone centers and individual use of mobile phones have increased in importance. At the time of our surveys, the use of mobile phones for transferring remittances was just beginning, as the networks had only recently been put in place. The mobile phone network, limited to the State capitals in 2004, had spread to the provincial centers of Zalingei and Kebkabiya just before these studies. In response to local demand in both locations there was an expansion of communications using landlines and especially through communication centers or phone booths. Concomitant with these changes was the significant decrease in postal mail and hand-carried messages/personal communications between senders and receivers. In the future, mobile phone technology will play a significant role by allowing the transfer of mobile phone credits which can be re-sold.
In Darfur, as in other conflict zones, livelihood systems are in transition. IDP strategies are constantly evolving in response both to partial blocking of previous livelihood strategies, and the new opportunities presented by urbanization and the distorting effects of the international community. Livelihood adaptations in the context of ongoing conflict and insecurity, distorted markets, lack of regulations and imposition of punitive taxation regimes and protection payments, cannot be considered either sustainable or equitable. Mal-adaptative livelihood strategies might provide food and income in the short-term, but they often incur indirect longer-term costs for the household, and can increase societal inequities and marginalization as well as over-exploiting limited natural resources. Locally appropriate and innovative approaches to support livelihoods are badly needed, but their newness makes it all the more important to monitor and evaluate their impacts on other livelihood groups, the local economy and environment. In particular the implications of livelihood maladaptations need to be recognized and where possible avoided.

Our findings have implications for three commonly asked questions:

- If and when IDPs will return back to their rural homes?
- How can a wider range of livelihood strategies be supported?
- Should remittances be supported and in what ways?

We think it unlikely that all or even most IDPs will return to their rural home areas and previous livelihoods. A more likely scenario is that IDPs will continue to foster their increasingly urbanized, ‘multi-nodal’ and transnational livelihoods. This has implications for the policy environment. Given the balance and coverage of current international humanitarian programming and lack of access to rural areas, livelihood interventions are likely to promote and support urban livelihoods in Darfur, and are unlikely to support return movements. Policy planners must also consider the potential ‘maladaptations’ that are taking place, particularly in terms of over-exploitation of limited natural resources, including water, agricultural land close to towns and forestry resources (timber).

The ‘multi-nodal’ and transnational nature of livelihoods broadens the potential arena for intervention, particularly when it comes to remittances. Earlier studies of remittances to conflict zones suggested that humanitarian agencies could contribute to livelihoods and recovery by “facilitating the renewal of remittance flows” for example by providing assistance with communications, transport, identity documents and banking (Savage and Harvey, 2007) (p38). Whether such interventions will have much impact on the Darfur remittance receiving context is debatable. Banking seems to have taken off on its own, without the need for further intervention by the international community. Adaptations by the IDPs themselves appear to have accommodated such problems as lack of identity documents for accessing remittances.

A key question is whether efforts should be made to promote remittances, i.e whether remittance flows do indeed make an important difference in the livelihoods of displaced people and their communities, and what indirect, potentially harmful consequences might ensue. Even assuming international interventions could facilitate and increase remittances, the issue of the impact increased remittances will have on displaced and non-displaced urban communities needs to be further understood. We think more attention should be paid to the problems of protection and security of remittance senders and receivers. It is also important to consider the community inequities that remittances can create or aggravate, which in turn lead to tensions. These tensions can also occur depending on the purposes to which remittances are put. For example, remittances used for community purposes (like the building of a mosque or school) are likely to have very different social effects than if remittances are used to invest in household wealth-increasing activities or increase conspicuous consumption.
Our study found that remittances receipts, while probably useful or even important to the consumption patterns of receiving households, benefit only a small proportion of the population. Rather than focusing on remittances, it is probably more helpful to recognize the globalized nature of IDP livelihoods, and how they encompass multiple policy and programming environments. Such a wide-angle lens on IDP livelihoods allows us to see a broader range of programming opportunities, and it presents the vulnerability of IDPs in a somewhat different light. Unless the expanding livelihoods domain of IDPs is supported by legal and governance frameworks, such as natural resource governance, or legal rights as migrant workers, IDP livelihoods will remain inherently vulnerable.

Localized protection threats endured by many IDPs in Darfur are likely to remain so long as the conflict continues, particularly the liabilities of asset ownership and risk of asset-stripping. The constant risk of marginal activities means IDPs are unable to provide adequate food or income for their households. This localized vulnerability affects women more than men who are more likely to be absent from camps. Women tend to carry the burden of displacement and have to develop alternative livelihood strategies in the limiting environment of the IDP camp. Women also have to face the day to day protection risks associated with many livelihood strategies. Our data on women’s education – the significant differences in all education levels between men and women, with women having much less education – is a chilling reminder of the profound and deeply embedded discrimination against women regardless of whether they were IDPs or urban residents.

Our analysis has implications for the dramatic political events and crises that occur on a day to day basis. As this is being written (April 2009), the issuing of the arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for the President of Sudan, Omar el-Bashir, for alleged war crimes in Darfur has triggered the decision by the government to expel thirteen international NGOs and three local NGOs operating in Darfur. The impact of this move on the livelihoods domain, the urbanized settings of IDP camps and transnational livelihood strategies remains to be seen and considered. One consequence (assuming that staff are not immediately re-employed) will be reduced spending by the INGOs and their staff, and the gradual reduction of the multiplier effects we discussed earlier.

The impact of international humanitarian assistance on the livelihoods of IDPs is not simply about the immediate impact of aid transfers. For most IDPs the impact of international interventions in Darfur has consequences for the wider urban settings, local economy and security. Understanding this wider impact requires the kind of reflection and monitoring that is not usually incorporated into the information systems of the UN or others, yet is crucial to a more nuanced and holistic view of humanitarian needs, impact and long-term implications.
References


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