Nationality in Ukraine: Some Rules of Engagement
Oxana Shevel

Although the fall of empires gives rise to states, it need not create nations. The collapse of the Soviet Union 10 years ago did not instantly transform citizens of its successor states into members of nations. As in other postimperial settings, in post-Soviet Ukraine the modern nation is built, or not. The question of Ukrainian nation-building deserves the attention it draws from social scientists. Described as “the West of the East or the East of the West,” and straddling the faultline between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania, Ukraine was partitioned among empires, and stood at the crossroads of various religious and cultural influences. In today’s Ukraine we perceive ethnic and linguistic diversity, a poor match to modern national ideals where “state borders confine linguistic communities, and the languages of speech, politics, and worship are one and the same.” In Ernest Gellner’s terms, it is not at all obvious that the Ukrainian political and the national units are “congruent.”

Attempts to make the nation match the state are called “nation-building,” although this term is extremely broad. In historical terms, attempts to build nations have ranged from wartime ethnic cleansing to peacetime textbook editing. Nation-building in independent Ukraine has received a good deal of attention in the past decade, with scholars evaluating the results as mixed. Studies of popular opinion question loyalties to the new state, while analyses of nation-building policies characterize them as vague and

indeterminate. Some scholars have questioned the existence of a coherent nation-building agenda, while others have argued that nation-building in Ukraine is hampered by the competing ideas of the Ukrainian nation, of which none is a majority view. It is sometimes unclear, however, just why the state takes some actions and not others, what national ideas have to do with national policy, whether nation-building projects must have something to do with nationalism, and indeed what is meant by terms such as “nation,” “national,” and “nation-building.”

In defining terms here, we will contend that the Ukrainian “nation” is best understood in terms of Ukrainian “nation-building.” The national identity of individuals, and the national orientation of politicians, are best judged by their attitudes and actions with respect to the Ukrainian state. Part one argues that national identity is most productively ascertained from reactions to policies in areas such as citizenship and state language which are regarded by politicians and populations alike as central to state survival. Based on 10 years of survey data, “national” and “non-national” populations can be distinguished according to their identification with a national or a non-national ideal political community, and their attitude towards the existing state. In Ukraine, the national/non-national distinction cuts across ethnic and linguistic cleavages. We will contend that this political distinction is a more empirically defensible and analytically useful premise for studies of nation-and state-building than attempts to ascribe political identity to putative groups defined by other criteria.

Just as we now have 10 years of public opinion data on state policies to evaluate public attitudes, we also have 10 years of parliamentary records, electoral platforms, and other evidence from which to judge the orientation of Ukrainian politicians. Part two employs the same distinction between national and non-national, arguing that national and non-national politicians see the existing

state as (respectively) the “proper” or “improper” political arrangement for the political community. National political forces wish to preserve and develop the current state, while non-national political forces favor the creation of a different state formation. Both forces advance their goals by broadening their base, trying to increase the share of (respectively) national or non-national populations. Some policies are seen by Ukrainian political actors as shifting boundaries between national and non-national populations by fostering either national or non-national identities. National and non-national forces therefore compete to influence state policies in these areas both to build societal support and to advance ultimate goals. If nationality policy is shaped by national forces, it will be designed to support formation of the nation that will sustain the existing state. If nationality policy comes to be shaped by non-national forces, it will be designed to support a non-national community, paving the way for liquidation of the existing state. These distinctions then inform a look at two areas of policy that Ukrainians regard as central to nation-building—the language of state and the possibility of dual citizenship. The survey leads to the conclusion that nation-building, understood in scholarly terms that capture the realities of Ukrainian politics, has advanced further than is generally thought.

**National and Non-National Populations**

The “imagined community,” to use Benedict Anderson’s term, need not be national. As Anderson observes, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact” are imagined. An ideal political community can be a religious, linguistic, or regional group, a civilization (such as Slavic or western), or a defunct empire (such as the Soviet Union). Whether or not such larger communities are imagined as national is the question posed to scholars of nation-building, and the task facing nation-builders. For our analysis, “national populations” are those individuals whose self-identification is national, who believe that the nation-state is the

proper realm of politics. The nation is their primary “imagined political community.” In the context of Ukraine, national individuals support the Ukrainian state as a “proper” political home for their imagined community. Non-national individuals, on the other hand, identify themselves with other sorts of imagined communities. (In the context of Ukraine, these communities can be subnational or supranational.) In politics, non-national individuals prefer a state that corresponds to their non-national community, which means supporting something rather different than the existing Ukrainian state. Table 1 summarizes the logic of this argument.

The emphasis on “primary” and “political” in the definitions above is important, since our political definition of nationality and the national/non-national distinction does not exclude the phenomenon of multiple identities. For the purposes of nation-building, what matters is not the number of identities an individual may have, but the hierarchy of their political relevance. Among identities, some may be purely social or cultural (identification with members of the same sex, for example, or the mainly or exclusively cultural interpretation of one’s ethnic identity). Politically rele-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Attitude to existing state</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Identify with the nation as their primary “imagined political community”</td>
<td>Favor existing state, seeing it is as their community’s proper political and territorial home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national</td>
<td>Identify with a sub- or supra-national community as their primary “imagined political community”</td>
<td>See existing state as improper home for their community, favor its liquidation and the formation of a different state</td>
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7. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have criticized use of the term “identity.” I seek to account for their criticisms by treating identity as a matter of demonstrable political loyalty or observable political actions. Identity is seen as a question of politically oriented action that scholars may observe and classify as such (Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29:1 [2000]: 1–47).
vant identities bear on one’s attitude towards the state. Of course, the political relevance of various self-identifications is not fixed. History records numerous occasions when cultural identity acquired political significance, or indeed vice versa. However, at any given time, one particular identity can be said to have the highest political relevance. Privileging the political significance of particular cultural practices is an object of nation-building and will be discussed as such below. The national/non-national dichotomy is therefore appropriate to the study of politics, even though the boundary between national and non-national populations is in historical flux. In fact, to understand the nature of this historical flux over the course, for example, of the last 10 years in Ukraine, we must be prepared to observe political sources of national identity—and non-national identity.

Most readers of this paper will be “national,” in my terms.8 A few examples may help us to see “non-national” orientations as something other than an absence. If we are to avoid nationalist assumptions ourselves, we must see that non-national orientations are extremely salient in much of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine. Such non-national identities can be regional, supranational, or both. An example of a regional non-national identity is an affinity with other residents of a given locality. Surveys find that self-identification with a region is a significant phenomenon in Ukraine.9 However, if a regional identity is not primary in one’s political hierarchy of identities, someone who has a regional identity can still be national in our terms. Regional identification does not exclude the acceptance of the existing state and thus a national identity (in our terms). One can declare a regional identity with-

out the further claim of national self-determination for that region.\textsuperscript{10} Except in Crimea, local separatism has been virtually absent in post-Soviet Ukraine, although local self-identification is a nationwide phenomenon.\textsuperscript{11} If, however, a regional identity is primary in one’s political hierarchy of identities, leading one to believe that one’s region should become a distinct state (or be joined to a neighboring state), this is an example of politically salient subnational identity. Such individuals would be non-national in their relation to the existing state.\textsuperscript{12}

Non-national identities can also be supranational: with a religious, civilizational, or historical community that transcends the borders of existing states. An example of supranational identity in Ukraine is a primary identification with the Soviet or East Slavic people and resulting political orientation towards the creation of a unified state of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, or indeed the restoration of the Soviet Union. Survey data suggest that a significant part of the Ukrainian population identifies itself supranationally. In the 1990s, almost 20 percent of the Ukrainian population considered themselves “Soviet.”\textsuperscript{13} According to various surveys, close to 30 percent of Ukrainian citizens oppose Ukraine’s independence, which is about the same as the percentage of those

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} In Ukrainian history, one may observe such attitudes among Lemkos. See Bogdan Horbal, \textit{Dzialalnosc polityczna Lemkow na Lemkowszczyznie, 1918–1921} (Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Arboretum, 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{11} In the 1990s, local separatist sentiments were present in Crimea (and, to a much smaller degree, in the Donbass and the Transcarpathian regions). A March 2001 survey by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research found that 8% of respondents in Crimea favored Crimean state independence (Igor Zhdanov, “Krym na politicheskoi karte Ukrainy,” \textit{Zerkalo Nedeli}, 28 April–5 May 2001). Variation in the degree of local self-identification across regions of Ukraine (43% national average) were reflected in the 1997 opinion poll (cited in Solchanyk, \textit{Ukraine and Russia}, 142).
\item \textsuperscript{12} Because the subject here is nation-building by internationally recognized sovereign states, not nation-building as such, national and non-national groups are defined relative to existing states, not relative to the “justifiability” (historical or otherwise) of existing or alternative state formations. This definition allows both subnational and supranational individuals to be treated as equally non-national relative to the existing state, although subnational and supranational identifications do of course differ in other important ways.
\item \textsuperscript{13} A 1994 survey found that 17% of Ukraine’s voting-age residents identify themselves as Soviets; a 2001 survey by the same polling organization found this figure to be 18% (Results of these nationwide surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences are in Fond Demokratychni Initiatiyvy, ed., \textit{Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy No. 8}; and Mykola Shulha, “Hromadska samoidentyfikatsia nasелennia Ukrainy”).
\end{itemize}
who want Ukraine and Russia to become a single state.¹⁴ Within the political definition of nationality, such people, about one-third of Ukraine’s population by various measures, are non-national, favoring a state different from the existing Ukrainian state.

Many politicians and scholars link national identity to attributes such as ethnic identity or language practice. While it would be foolish to deny the correlations between such attributes and political nationality in our terms, the data do not show that such attributes bring about a national orientation. For example, self-identified ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian and reside in Western Ukraine are usually national populations in our political sense of supporting the state. Upon reflection, this correlation of multiple attributes demonstrates very little. As political scientists say, there is an immense covariation problem. If language, ethnicity, region, and political nationality all coincide, how can we know what is causing what? Perhaps Ukrainian political nationality has favored Ukrainian ethnic self-identification and Ukrainian linguistic practice, rather than the other way around? In any event, western Ukraine is a very small part of the country; Galicia, seen as the most “nationalist” region in western Ukraine, is home to only 10.7 percent of Ukraine’s population.¹⁵

**Ethnicity.** Outside western Ukraine, our national/non-national political divide cuts across ethnic and linguistic cleavages. Let us take ethnic self-identification first, keeping in mind that “ethnicity” as an analytical category is usually nothing more than the acceptance by scholars of assertions made by individuals to bureaucrats who take censuses. We shall take it seriously to make our

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case as difficult as possible. The 1989 census in Ukraine recorded 73 percent of the population as ethnic Ukrainians, and 27 percent as belonging to over 100 other ethnic groups (22 percent, or 11.4 million, self-identified ethnic Russians).\textsuperscript{16} Using ethnic self-identification as a marker, a Ukrainian/non-Ukrainian distinction is sometimes made, with self-identified ethnic Ukrainians assumed to have the strongest sense of loyalty to the Ukrainian state. Yet a simple distinction into national/non-national populations along ethnic lines would be misleading. Recall that in the surveys, cited above, around 30 percent of respondents opposed Ukraine’s independence and agreed that Ukraine and Russia should form a single state. This means that at least 3 percent (and we may be certain that the figure is higher) of self-identified ethnic Ukrainians are non-national in our political sense, since they do not support the state. The reason we can be sure that the figure for non-national ethnic Ukrainians is higher than 3 percent is that this estimate assumes that all ethnic Russians in Ukraine believe that Ukraine and Russia should unite. In fact, the proportion of self-declared ethnic Russians who are national Ukrainians is probably quite significant.

To see this, consider the thorniest case. Crimea is the only region of Ukraine where self-identified ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the population (67 percent according to 1989 census). The Crimean peninsula was proverbially anti-Ukrainian in orientation since Soviet times, and since 1991 has been the only region of independent Ukraine to pursue separatist politics. That it is the least “Ukrainian” part of the country is universally recognized. Yet a survey conducted by the Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Research in March 2001, found that even in Crimea a minority (47 percent) favored Crimea’s unification with Russia (another 8 percent wanted Crimea to be an independent state). Let us make the (unlikely and worst-case for our analysis) assumption that all ethnic Russians in Crimea chose one of these two options. Even so, the total of those non-national towards the Ukrainian state in Crimea (55 percent) is still far smaller than the

share of self-identified ethnic Russians in the region (67 percent). Of survey respondents, 36 percent, considerably higher than the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea (26 percent), accepted the integration of Crimea within Ukraine.\textsuperscript{17} Even in Crimea, some self-identified ethnic Russians are national Ukrainians, in the political sense of supporting the Ukrainian state.

If political nationality is not reducible to ethnic self-identification, classification problems cannot be resolved by more sophisticated measurements of ethnicity. Indeed, as studies of ethnicity become more subtle, we are left wondering what the notion of ethnic self-identification contains. An example of a breakdown into ethnic groups with a possibility of a dual ethnic identity is a December 1997 survey by the Kyiv Institute of Political Research and Conflict Studies. The survey showed that, given a choice of identity combinations, between 6 percent and 27 percent of the population (depending on how the question was posed) self-identified as having a “Ukrainian–Russian” identity.\textsuperscript{18} That people feel themselves both Ukrainian and Russian is not surprising, given the long history of existence within one state, high intermarriage rates, and the linguistic assimilation of “census Ukrainians” during the Soviet period.\textsuperscript{19} Yet the political significance of a combined Ukrainian–Russian identity is by no means obvious. Even if one assumes that the “Ukrainian only” group (56 percent) is most national towards the Ukrainian state while “Russian only” (11 percent) is least, there

\textsuperscript{17} The answers to the survey question about the future status of Crimea were as follows: 47% favored the transfer of Crimea to Russia, 26% thought Crimea should be a territorial autonomy within Ukraine, 10% thought it should be an ordinary region (oblast) of Ukraine, 8% wanted it to be an independent state, and 3% wanted it to be a national-territorial autonomy of the Crimean Tatars within Ukraine (Zhdanov, “Krym na politicheskoi karte Ukrainy”).

\textsuperscript{18} Given three options, 69% identified themselves as Ukrainian only, 20% as Russian only, and 6% as both Ukrainian and Russian. When options within the latter category were given, the answers were: 56% Ukrainian only, 11% Russian only, 27% both Ukrainian and Russian (of whom 7% more Ukrainian than Russian, 14% equally Ukrainian and Russian, and 5% more Russian than Ukrainian) (Survey results as cited in Wilson, The Ukrainians, 219).

\textsuperscript{19} In the 1989 census, 64.7% named Ukrainian as their mother tongue—less than the 72.6% who identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians. Thus, 12.3% of self-identified ethnic Ukrainians considered Russian as their mother tongue (of self-identified ethnic Russians, only 1.6% named Ukrainian as their mother tongue on the census). 1989 census data in Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine, 25. Since the declared mother tongue was not necessarily that spoken in daily life, an even higher percentage of ethnic Ukrainians are Russified linguistically.
is little reason to assume that the “more-Ukrainian-than-Russian” group (7 percent) is any less national with regard to the Ukrainian state than the “Ukrainian only” group. Likewise, placement in the “equally-Ukrainian-and-Russian” group (14 percent) reveals little about national identity, i.e., one’s attitude to the Ukrainian state. As noted above, people may understand questions about ethnic identity in personal, family, or cultural terms.

If they understand identity in political terms, another problem arises. It need not be the case, after all, that ethnicity drives national loyalty. The reverse is certainly possible as well. People may respond to questions about ethnicity or identity in terms of political preferences. The precedents for people responding to survey questions in political rather than neutral scientific terms are, naturally, abundant. For example, 70 years ago in regions that are now western Ukraine, Zionist Jews told Polish census-takers that their mother tongue was Hebrew. This claim about language was false, but it made a political statement. Anecdotal evidence suggests that something similar took place during the December 2001 census in Ukraine. Especially in Kyiv, some people who speak Russian on a daily basis but who are national Ukrainians in our sense made a point of categorizing themselves as ethnic Ukrainians and their mother tongue as Ukrainian.

Language. Students of Ukrainian politics also use linguistic practice as a proxy for national identity. Two claims are often made together: many ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine speak Russian, and

20. Consider this statement by a Ukrainian citizen, evincing a dual cultural but not a dual political identity. “I am not against Russia, and my mother tongue is Russian. In my passport it is written that I am Ukrainian, but my mother is Russian. But I do not understand why do we have to mix the notions of state and culture. If Ukraine has a chance to part with the Communist past, even separately from Russia, I am for it with both hands” (emphasis in the original) (Posting on internet discussion board at http://www.for-ua.com/forum.php, 26 April 2001, signed Maxim Kizub).


22. For some, such self-identification was also a change from the ethnic and linguistic identity they declared during the 1989 census. Some young Ukrainians went so far as to list English rather than Russian as the other language they know (the 2001 census questionnaire allowed respondents only one language entry besides the mother tongue). Though such occurrences were not on a massive scale, clearly political identity can drive empirical manifestations of ethnic and linguistic identity, rather than the other way around.
language is a better indicator of one’s attitude to the Ukrainian state than ethnicity. Surveys on language use reveal an approximately equal number of Russophones and Ukrainophones in Ukraine, plus a significant number of those who claim to actively use both languages in daily life. Given that up to a quarter of the population claim to be actively bilingual in private life, the Russophone/Ukrainophone distinction is problematic a priori.\(^{23}\) According to various surveys that gauge the respondents’ “language of convenience,” between 43 percent and 55 percent are Russophone,\(^ {24}\) while some politicians assert that the Russophones constitute as much as three-quarters of the population.\(^ {25}\)

Such politicians often proceed to argue that the majority in Ukraine supports Ukraine’s unification with Russia, official status for the Russian language in Ukraine, and so on. Yet survey data show that the share of the population favoring such measures is less than half of the population, i.e., smaller than the estimated number of Russophones in Ukraine. For example, in January 2000, 44 percent favored giving Russian the status of official language in Ukraine, while 41 percent “positively” or “mainly positively” regarded the idea of Ukraine joining the Russian-Belarusian Union.\(^ {26}\) Note that joining the Russian-Belarusian Union is a far

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23. In reply to the question about language used at home asked in annual surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science of Ukraine, Socis-Gallup, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation from 1994 to 2000, the proportion of respondents who said they used “Ukrainian only” ranged from 32% to 39%, “Russian only” from 32% to 36%, and “both, depending on circumstances” from 25% to 35% (Fond Demokratychni Initiatiyvy, "Ukrainske suspilstvo 1994–2000, 57"). Corresponding numbers from a survey conducted in December 1997 by the Kyiv Center for Political Research and Conflict Studies were 41% Ukrainian, 44% Russian, and 14% both (survey results as cited in Wilson, The Ukrainians, 220).

24. Survey results as cited in Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia, 148. Solchanyk notes that “language of convenience” is understood as the language respondents use more comfortably in interviews (ibid., 154, ff 10).

25. For example, during his visit to Crimea in April 2001, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov claimed that 75% of the Ukrainian population “thinks in Russian,” and that ethnic Russians therefore should be given the status of “state-forming nation” (gosudarstvoobrazuiushchaia natsia) in Ukraine. Some non-national parties in Ukraine, for example the Soiuz (Union) party, define the same objective (Luzhkov as quoted in “Russkie—gosudarstvoobrazuiushchaia natsia v Ukrainе?” Korrespondent.net, 28 April 2001, at http://www.korrespondent.net. Soiuz Party’s 1998 electoral program in Politchni Partii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Tovarystvo “K.I.S.” 1998), 377).

26. Opposed to giving Russian the status of official language were 36%, and 19% were undecided. On the question of Ukraine's membership in the Russian-Belarusian Union, 37% were “against” or “mainly against,” and 22% were undecided (Results from
cry from formally relinquishing Ukrainian sovereignty, which is what Russophones are supposed to support. Note also that in the January 2000 survey cited above, support for joining the Russian-Belarusian Union (41 percent) was less significant than support for Ukraine’s membership in the European Union (56 percent). Although it is unclear how large the “group” of Russophones is, it is clear that a significant portion of people who are so characterized support Ukrainian statehood. In this sense, the two views mentioned above mutually contradict: (1) that Russophones are a large majority in Ukraine; and (2) that language determines national identity. The more “Russophones” there are in Ukraine, the more “Russophones” there are who accept a Ukrainian political orientation. The higher one believes the proportion of Russophones in Ukraine to be, the better the reason one has to reject the view that language causes nationality.27

**National and Non-National Political Forces**

Since national identity is not prescribed by ethnicity or language practice, national identity can change even when these traits remain constant. This means that political evidence is a more promising gauge of political loyalty than ethnicity or language. This is also where nation-building as state policy comes into play. While Ukrainian politicians would not make the case in our stiff academic terms, their behavior suggests the validity of our political measure of nationality. The Ukrainian political class as a whole accepts the causal link between nationality policy, the size of national populations, and the survival of the state. However this may be as

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January 2000 survey of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science of Ukraine, Socis-Gallup, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation. Fond Demokratychni Initiatiyvy, *Ukrainske suspïlstvo 1994–2000*, 20). 27. It is worth emphasizing that “ethnic” and “linguistic” criteria of nationality are not politically neutral. While the Russian Federation defines itself as multiethnic, its politicians tend to deny its neighbors the same privilege. Russians assume that people in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics who speak Russian or who have called themselves ethnic Russians in censuses are also politically Russian nationals. As we have seen, this is often not the case. Consult Roman Szporluk, “Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood,” Harriman Review 7:7–9 (March–May 1994): 1–9. This and other pertinent articles are reprinted in Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Press, 2000).

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Table 2. National and Non-National Political Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political force</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Support the existing state</td>
<td>Increase national populations</td>
<td>Nationality policies seen to increase the share of national populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national</td>
<td>Undermine the existing state</td>
<td>Decrease national populations</td>
<td>Nationality policies seen to increase the share of non-national populations</td>
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</table>

An empirical matter, policies that are seen to nationalize or de-nationalize populations are those most vigorously contested by national and non-national political forces. In Ukrainian politics, the important questions are not individual declarations of ethnicity and language, but how citizenship and language policy shapes the society in which they live.

Dividing political forces such as parties into national and non-national is easier than dividing the population. As discussed above, the boundary between national and non-national populations does not match census and survey-measured characteristics such as ethnicity, language, or region of residence. We proposed an alternative: political preferences on questions of state survival and nationality policy. With regard to parties, a clear measure of whether a party is national or non-national is its position on the future of the state as specified in its programs and electoral platforms. National parties accept Ukraine’s independence and statehood as a desirable and durable political reality, while non-national parties aspire to create an alternative state formation (a restored Soviet Union, a Slavic Union, etc.). Over 110 existing Ukrainian political parties can be readily divided into the national/non-national groups with a fair degree of certainty. Since only a handful of these parties are represented in the parliament, only these few will be examined with greater scrutiny.

Most “centrist parties” (usually run by oligarchs or government officials) represent what can be called a “soft” national group, as opposed to the “hard” national group composed of the right of
center parties. The hard and soft national forces differ in two ways. The first is the priority they attach to Ukrainian statehood. The hard national group is ideologically committed to Ukrainian statehood as the highest value. Many of the hard national parties sprang from Rukh, the driving force of Ukrainian independence. The hard national camp includes such center-right parties with parliamentary representation as the two branches of the once-united Rukh, Reforms and Order, as well as smaller right-wing parties such as Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Republican party, and Sobor.\textsuperscript{28} Centrist parties in the soft national camp include Labor Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party (united), Democratic Union, the National Democratic Party, Regions of Ukraine, Agrarian Party, Greens, and Yabluko. Like the hard national parties, soft national parties treat the existing Ukrainian state as the proper realm of polities, but place less emphasis on statehood in their programmatic documents.\textsuperscript{29} Second, while most hard national parties are explicitly pro-western, emphasizing the importance of Ukraine's cooperation with and integration into western institutions, soft national parties stop short of openly prioritizing relations with the west. Since the business interests of these parties, often called “oligarchic,” are closely tied to Russian business groups, soft national parties are considered to a various degree oriented towards Russia.\textsuperscript{30} Voting results on nationally sensitive legislation shows that deputies from soft national parties vote

\textsuperscript{28} The 1998 electoral programs of virtually all of these parties emphasize statehood. Rukh’s 1998 program stipulates that “the main goals of Rukh are establishment of Ukraine’s independence, and development of Ukrainian national democratic nation” (\textit{Politychni Partii Ukrainy}, 177). The 1998 electoral program of the Reforms and Order party is mainly devoted to detailing proposed economic reform measures, but its opening sentence shows a fully national position towards the Ukrainian state. The party “is united around the idea of implementing socio-economic and political measures to establish in Ukraine democratic society and law-abiding state” (\textit{Politychni Partii Ukrainy}, 358).

\textsuperscript{29} The 1998 electoral program of the Social Democratic party (united) is an example of a “soft” national position: “Social democrats are convinced supporters of state independence of Ukraine, of the strengthening of its sovereignty and authority in the world. At the same time, we are against the politics of isolationism and the ideology of national exclusivity” (\textit{Politychni Partii Ukrainy}, 460).

\textsuperscript{30} A survey of Ukrainian elites conducted in June–July 2001 asked them to characterize foreign-policy priorities of major Ukrainian political parties. Experts saw the following “centrist” parties primarily oriented towards Russia: Labor Ukraine (61\%), Regions of Ukraine (42\%), National-Democratic party (37\%), Yabluko (33\%), and Democratic Union (29\%). Social Democrats (united) and the Green party were perceived
similarly with the deputies from hard national parties, although with less unanimity.\(^{31}\)

As between national and non-national populations, the boundary between national and non-national forces is also fluid. In the past ten years, we saw shifts from soft to hard in the national camp, and perhaps even from non-national to national in party politics in general. An example of this drift is the evolution of the initially centrist Fatherland (\textit{Batkivshchyna}) Party (formerly \textit{Hromada}). After the arrest and imprisonment of its leader Yulia Timoshenko in 2001, and her decision to oppose President Leonid Kuchma, Fatherland allied with traditionally hard national political forces, such as the Ukrainian Republican Party and Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party. In December 2001, Fatherland formed a coalition with these and other hard and soft nationalist parties for the 2002 parliamentary elections.\(^{32}\) We may also be witnessing a move of the Socialist Party, headed by Oleksandr Moroz, from the non-national to national camp. Moroz, a foremost critic of President Kuchma after the outbreak of the tapes scandal in late 2000, cooperated with the right and the center-right parties during 2001, thereby distancing himself from the non-national rhetoric of such former allies as the Communists and Progressive Socialists.

In the non-national camp, the main force remains the Com-

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\item A recent illustration of an issue that perfectly divided the political spectrum in Ukraine along national/non-national lines is the draft law “On the Status of Foreign Ukrainians.” The law was drawn up to legally acknowledge a responsibility of the Ukrainian state towards this group, and to grant ethnic Ukrainians residing abroad certain privileges, such as visa-free travel to Ukraine. Five attempts to pass the law in the first reading failed between December 2000 and September 2001. Voting results show that nearly all MPs from non-national parties such as Communists, Socialists and Progressive Socialists, voted against the law; nearly all hard national parties voted for; while deputies of the soft national parties also supported the law, but by a smaller majority. In the 22 March 2001 vote, for example, 78% of MPs from soft national parties present in the parliament voted for, with the remaining 22% abstaining. Among MPs from “hard” national parties, 92% of those present voted for (8% abstained), while among MPs from the non-national parties such as Communists and Socialists 84% voted against, 15% abstained, and only one MP voted for. Roll-call voting results are available at http://rada.gov.ua/plenar.htm.
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\end{footnotesize}
munist Party. In the 1990s, it was the single most popular party in the country (supported by about 20 percent of the electorate), and the largest faction in the present Ukrainian parliament (112 out of 450 seats). Other more or less influential non-national parties are the extreme-left Progressive Socialist Party, the center-left Socialist Party, and a number of smaller parties such as the Slavic Party. Although different in many important ways, especially on economic policy, all these parties are similarly non-national in their rejection of Ukrainian statehood as the final political arrangement. Non-national political forces support a political transformation that would make Ukraine a part of a supranational political arrangement, such as the renewed Soviet Union or a Slavic Union with Russia and Belarus. Since Ukrainians are not seen as a separate political nation, but as part of a larger group (such as Soviet, or Slavic, or Eastern Orthodox), the proper state formation is not seen to be the existing Ukrainian state.

The goals of national and non-national forces are fundamentally different. The former strive to consolidate Ukrainian statehood, while the latter work for its liquidation. Thus, national and non-national forces would be expected to support the nationality policy that they believe would facilitate the achievement of these

33. Annual surveys conducted between 1994 and 2000 by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science of Ukraine, Socis-Gallup, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation show the level of popular support for communist parties fluctuating in the 10%–22% range (Fond Demokratychni Initiatiyyv, Ukrainske suspilstvo 1994–2000). In July 2001, popular former prime minister Victor Yushchenko announced the formation of his center-right electoral bloc “Our Ukraine” for the 2002 parliamentary elections; this bloc and the Communist party have been leaders in the opinion polls, with between 16% and 22% of support each (For poll results, see “Blok “Nasha Ukraina” ta KPU lidyriut u reitinhu ukrainskykh partii,” Korespondent.net, 22 Oco

34. The 1998 electoral communist program endorsed “the recreation of the renewed family of brotherly people of the criminally-destroyed Soviet Union,” noting that “the first step in this direction should be the creation of the Union of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus” (Politychni Partii Ukrainy, 109). The 1998 electoral program of Soiuz spoke of “a real and close economic and political union of equal states and nations” (ibid., 375). The Socialist party, which occupies the position closest to the national one in the non-national camp, acknowledged the independence of Ukraine in its 1998 electoral program, with a qualifier that “Ukrainian independence is fully integrated (economically, politically, spiritually, ethnically, militarily, etc.) with other CIS countries” (ibid., 499). The program of the Slavic party proposed the “recreation of national, spiritual, economic and historical unity of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus,” (ibid., 68–71).
goals. And it follows that both national and non-national parties would work to increase the size of their constituencies by seeking to increase the size of national or non-national populations. Before testing these expectations against policy, a possibly apparent contradiction should be clarified.

As discussed above, ethnicity and language, no matter how sensitively measured, cannot be equated with political nationality. The point of the aforementioned exposition was not to assert the absence of any link between such personal attributes and political nationality, but rather to demonstrate that a great deal of space must be ceded to politics itself. It would appear then that better measurements of political nationality are the expressed political preferences about the future of the Ukrainian state. The apparent tension between questioning the causal link between ethnicity and language to nationality, on the one hand, and claiming that Ukrainian politicians use language policy to enlarge constituencies and further ideological aims is not hard to resolve. It would be sufficient to say that what matters is not whether such measures are actually effective, but whether Ukrainian politicians believe they are, as they clearly do.

More important, there is a perhaps subtle but significant difference between self-characterizations of ethnicity and linguistic practice, and state policy on citizenship and language. The former involve individuals’ describing what they think or do at the moment they are asked a question; the latter concerns serious calculations about the future. When the Ukrainian state provides only for single citizenship, it does something more subtle and more interesting than preventing people from saying that they are Russians. Instead, it suggests that participation in Ukrainian politics is a sound choice for all citizens, and that Kyiv rather than Moscow is where political disputes will be resolved in the foreseeable future. In the long term, fewer citizens of Ukraine may call themselves “ethnic Russians”—December 2001 census data are presently being analyzed—and this would properly be seen as one sign of a political reorientation.

Similarly, when the Ukrainian state makes language policy, it does something more subtle and more interesting than changing what language people actually use. As everyone knows, just be-
cause Ukrainian is the only state language does not mean that citizens of Ukraine only speak Ukrainian. Language, after all, is a personal matter, and it requires effort to learn a language one does not know. When one knows two languages, a personal judgment dictates which is appropriate and productive in a given social situation. Precisely because language acquisition is difficult and risky, it requires people to consider the long-term future, very often the future of the next generation, of sons and daughters. Ukrainian’s status as the only state language is not about the state’s dictating which language is used in the vain hope that doing so would immediately create a national community. Rather, it is about creating a set of social opportunities linked to the Ukrainian language and thereby connecting personal choices to the future of the state.

**National and Non-National Policy**

*Language.* Though the language policies of the 1990s are commonly characterized as haphazard in conception and lax in implementation, we can see nationalizing effects of the simple fact that Ukrainian has been the only state language since 1989. That Ukrainian is the only state language appears to influence the long-term calculations of Ukrainian citizens in important matters such as schooling. Expected future economic return for learning or not learning Ukrainian is now considered within a political reality defined by a Ukrainian state that officially functions in Ukrainian. There is good evidence that in Ukraine, most notably in the predominantly Russian-speaking capital Kyiv, parents

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35. The legal status of Ukrainian as the language of state administration has not been enforced in southern and eastern Ukraine, where the percentage of Ukrainian schools also remained low (although not uniformly throughout); Dominique Arel, “Language Politics in Independent Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers* 23:3 (January–March 1995): 597–622. For a regional comparison of the percentage of schoolchildren in Ukrainian-language schools in Ukraine in 1991 and in 2000, see “Частка учнів денної загальноосвітніх навчальних закладів, які навчаються українською мовою,” a document available from the internet site of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education at [http://www.education.gov.ua](http://www.education.gov.ua).

36. That the decision of the “Russian-speaking population” to add the titular language to their repertoire depends on calculations about expected economic returns and expected levels of status gains and losses experienced should the Russian-speakers learn the language, was demonstrated by David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: the Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad,* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
now prefer Ukrainian schools for their children. Soviet-era policies created a system of incentives for parents to educate children in Russian, the language of power and social advancement in the Soviet Union. Parents in Ukraine now seem to reason that in Ukraine the Ukrainian language is becoming the language of politics and social advancement.\textsuperscript{37} Again, the point is not that parents believe this is already true, or will even be true in five years, but that it will be true when their children graduate high school or university. In this light, the evidence from Crimea is especially striking. Ukrainian schooling is all but unavailable. Only four of 583 schools on the peninsula provide instruction in Ukrainian; 98 percent of schoolchildren are educated in Russian. Nevertheless, in 2000, 47 percent of ninth graders chose to write dictation in Ukrainian during final exam, and 25 percent of the graduating eleventh graders chose to write a composition in Ukrainian during final exams. This considerable effort was likely guided by the expectation of continuing higher education in mainland Ukraine, where Ukrainian-language instruction in universities is becoming the rule.\textsuperscript{38}

The nationalizing effects of Ukrainian’s status as the only state

\textsuperscript{37} This conclusion was also reached by OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) High Commissioner of National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, who in 2000 investigated the situation of Russian-language education in Ukraine at the request of the Russian government. In the High Commissioner’s opinion, one of the reasons behind the increase in the percentage of children educated in Ukrainian is “the conviction of many parents that in independent Ukraine it might be advantageous for the future careers of their children to go to Ukrainian-language schools” (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, “Letter of 12 January 2001 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ukraine, Mr. Anatoly M. Zlenko, and the letter of reply, dated 6 April 2001,” available at \url{http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/recommendations/ukraine/index.php3). From 1991 to 2000, the proportion of schoolchildren taught in Ukrainian in secondary schools increased from 49% to 70% (“Chastka uchiv dennykh zahalnoosvitnikh navchalnykh zakladiv . . .”) Also consult Dominique Arel, “A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?” \textit{Post-Soviet Affairs} 12:1 (January–March 1996): 73–90. Arel notes that by the mid–1990s, 90% of first-graders in schools of Kyiv were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools, “three times more than the outset of the national revival in the late 1980s, and five times more than the proportion of Kievans who use Ukrainian as their language of convenience at home. Tellingly, this drastic Ukrayinizatsiya of the school network has provoked little, if any, debate in the printed media” (77).

\textsuperscript{38} Data from Crimea in Zhdanov, “Krym na politicheskoi karte Ukrainy.” According to official statistics from early 2000, in Ukraine overall, 35% of college and university students receive education in Russian (Statistics from a 12 February 2000 statement [zaiava] of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, available from \url{http://www.mfa.gov.ua}).
language are also notable at the elite level. Many Russophone officials from eastern Ukraine have learned Ukrainian and use it in public, rather than seeking to change state language policy to conform to their personal linguistic abilities. News coverage of an ascending political career ritualistically refers to Ukrainian lessons, and the evolution of President Kuchma’s position as well as the change in his own practice is telling. One of Kuchma’s 1994 campaign promises, reiterated in his 1994 inaugural address, was to preserve Ukrainian as the state language (for diplomacy and legislation) while giving Russian the status of a second official language (for all other spheres of public life). Kuchma never followed up on this promise. In fact, he has learned Ukrainian and uses it in public (and apparently to some extent even in private, as revealed by what are alleged to be private conversations in his office taped by a bodyguard in 1999–2000).

Again, the point is not that linguistic practice as such is what matters. After all, many children attending Ukrainian schools speak Russian with their parents at home, Russian with their schoolmates and at recess, and even Russian with their teachers between classes. Most of the elites now using Ukrainian in public continue to operate in Russian outside of official settings. Whether those who switch to Ukrainian in public while retaining Russian in private are more likely to be politically national is an empirical question. Surveys studying attitudes to the state, which group respondents according to language use in different settings, would be useful here. Yet regardless of what such surveys would reveal about personal attitudes, people who use Ukrainian for political reasons confirm a certain idea of political normality and convey an idea of the likely political future. Shifts in language use in educational or political settings suggest the acceptance of rules of engagement set by the state — and, thus, of the state’s right to set such rules, its legitimacy. The politics of language matters to the politics of nationality, with politics driving language, rather than the other way around. In this connection, it is interesting that the policy of

40. Arguably, this has been true of the Ukrainian movement from the beginning. See Roman Szporluk, “Des marches de l’empire à la construction d’une nation,” L’Autre Europe: 30–31 (1995), 147.
Ukrainian as the exclusive state language is increasingly accepted by citizens of Ukraine. Like politically national forces, politically non-national parties do not simply equate language practice and national identity. They take for granted the difference between policy on language, a matter of the future of the state, and the speech of Ukrainian citizens, a matter of daily practice. They too believe that the signals sent and the opportunities provided by state language policy increase or decrease the size of the politically national population, and the chances for survival of the Ukrainian state. Just as national political forces believe that raising the status and use of Ukrainian is conducive to national political identity and strengthening of Ukrainian statehood, non-national parties believe that maintaining Russian as the dominant language would facilitate political assimilation into a Slavic or Soviet supranational identity. Because they prefer the destruction of the existing state, and perceive the relationship between language policy and the size of constituencies, non-national political forces want Russian to be given equal status in the law.

The goal of state (or official) status for the Russian language appears in the programs of virtually all non-national parties. Although its advocates employ the rhetoric of equal rights, their agen-

41. Annual surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science of Ukraine, Sociis-Gallup, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation between 1994 and 2000 reveal that those favoring official status for the Russian language in Ukraine declined from 52% in 1995 to 44% in 2000, while those opposing it grew from 33% to 36%. The undecided increased from 15% to 19% (Fond Demokratychni Iniatiyvy, Ukrainskoe suspilsstvo 1994–2000, 20).

42. Russian politicians who do not accept the legitimacy of Ukraine as a separate state also recognize the connection between state language policy and Ukraine’s future prospects. The desire for Russian to be given the status of state language in Ukraine was expressed, for example, by Georgii Tikhonov. Tikhonov was head of the Russian State Duma Committee on CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, a group known for its anti-Ukrainian views. During the December 1998 Duma debate on the ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian Friendship Treaty, Tikhonov said: “Let them add a clause to the treaty: ‘two state languages’, and 90% of our objections will be addressed. We cannot divide language and culture. One language, one culture, is one nation. Do not make us divide our state into separate states.” Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov made it clear that this is also an objective of the Russian government: “it would be ideal if Russian was given the status of second state language [in Ukraine]. We will continue active work in this direction” (see Federalnoe Sobranie—parlament Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, “Stenogramma zasedanii, Buiuletien No. 227 (369), 25 dekabria 1998 goda” [Moskva: Izdanie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy], 19–20, 22).
da is one of state destruction. No serious observer doubts that their goal is not to create bilingualism, but to preserve the dominance of Russian, at the very least in the eastern half of Ukraine.43 This is evident from pending drafts of a new language law that would not require mandatory use of both languages in all official settings. Instead, the proposals stipulate that both languages will have equal status as “official languages” of the state, and either could be used in the daily practice of state administration. The use of Ukrainian as a “state” language would be reserved for ceremonial functions such as diplomatic events and the language of international agreements.44 In today’s Ukraine, Russian dominates public life outside of western Ukraine and is still the language of convenience for the majority of the population. Official bilingualism is designed to remove existing incentives to use Ukrainian, increase non-national populations, and decrease the state’s chances for survival. Proposals to make Russian a second state or official language have been unsuccessful so far. In the run-up to the March 2002 parliamentary elections, the “language question” surfaced once again. On 30 November 2001, the Ukrainian parliament considered six draft language laws (five of which proposed to make Russian an “official” or “state” language) in the first reading. No vote was taken. With every year that official bilingualism is not introduced, it seems less likely that it will be. The threshold for change has also been set fairly high. The 1996 constitution defined Ukrainian as the only state language in Ukraine, and a December 1999 ruling of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court reaffirmed this line.45 Nevertheless, non-national political forces continue to propose such a change, and the state language remains a political issue.

44. For the texts of alternative drafts of the law on languages (numbered 2235, and 2235-1 through 2235-5) submitted to the parliament between November 1998 and September 2000 and considered in first reading on 30 November 2001, see http://zakon.gov.ua. Draft 2235-4 is the government draft that defines Ukrainian as the only state language and does not contain a notion of “official” language as distinct from a “state” language. Other submitted drafts propose giving Russian status of “official” or “state” language.
45. The Constitutional Court considered the constitutional provision on the state status of the Ukrainian language, in particular its mandatory use by organs of state power. Importantly, it equated the terms “state” and “official” language in its ruling. The 14 December 1999 ruling of the Constitutional Court is available at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/laws/pravo/all/zakl.htm as Constitutional Court case No. 1-6/99.
Citizenship. The vigor of the debate over the state language certainly recommends it to our attention. Dual citizenship, on the other hand, is no longer an issue in Ukraine and receives little attention. Indeed, citizenship policy in general is virtually absent from scholarship on nation-building in Ukraine. However, dual citizenship in Ukraine, a policy that did not happen, is equally important for the understanding of nation-building, since it shows how nation-building prevailed over the alternative of non-building. An issue whose importance was once generally acknowledged, and which once divided political forces perfectly along national and non-national lines, was resolved along the lines supported by national forces. To see how the terms of debate in Ukraine have changed, how the present moment of nation-building is different from 10 years ago, we should begin at the beginning.

From 1991, national political forces favored a single citizenship principle as a way to strengthen the state by fostering undivided political loyalties. Non-national forces favored dual citizenship with Russia, as a way to foster non-national identities conducive to the destruction of then-emerging Ukrainian state. Although advocates of dual citizenship rationalized their position in terms of individual rights, politically they saw dual citizenship as serving their ultimate objective to create a common state formation with Russia. When the first citizenship law was discussed in the Ukrainian parliament in October 1991, the dual citizenship clause came just two (!) votes short of being passed. The final text of

47. For the rhetoric used, see the verbatim report of the 1991 citizenship law reading in the Ukrainian parliament. Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, Chetverta sessia Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy XIIIho sklykannia, “Zakon Ukrainy pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy—dureme chytannia,” 8 October 1991, in Bulletin # 18 (Kyiv: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 1991): 3–64. The 1998 electoral program of the Slavic party is forthright: “the introduction of the dual citizenship principle is the way towards one CIS citizenship,” (Politychni Partii Ukrainy, 71). The 1998 electoral program of the Progressive Socialist party listed dual citizenship as a party goal (ibid., p. 394), but neither the Communist nor the Socialist parties listed it in their 1998 electoral programs. This is evidence that the issue of dual citizenship had lost political salience.
48. In the vote on the dual citizenship clause, 224 MPs, 2 short of the 226 needed, voted for the wording “dual citizenship is allowed” (“Zakon Ukrainy pro hromadianstvo Ukrainy—dureme chytannia,” 26).
the article was a compromise: “in Ukraine there is single citizenship. Dual citizenship is allowed on the basis of bilateral agreements.” Since advocates of dual citizenship from non-national parties in particular expected dual citizenship with Russia, one national parliamentarian suggested during the debate that such an agreement with Russia will “probably” be concluded. Such gestures were likely intended to appease supporters of dual citizenship, and to encourage them to vote for the compromise wording of Article 1 and the law as a whole.

No treaty on dual citizenship with Russia (or any other state) ever materialized. The executive branch, in particular the Citizenship Department of the presidential administration and the Foreign Ministry, strongly opposed dual citizenship. Ukrainian officials described preservation of single citizenship as a matter of “national interests,” and opposed agreements on dual citizenship. The Russian Federation, for its part, favored and continues to favor dual citizenship with other post-Soviet states. As with the language debate, the turning point in the dual citizenship debate was the constitution adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 28 June 1996 in a dramatic all-night session. The article-by-article ratification process, whereby each provision was discussed and voted on independently, resulted in the adoption of the article on citizenship that did not mention dual citizenship. Article 4 of the constitution reads: “In Ukraine there is a single citizenship. The acquisition and loss of Ukrainian citizenship is regulated by law.” As on the language status question, non-national deputies, in par-

51. Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister Volodymyr Khandogii argued that “Concluding agreements on dual citizenship may in the future lead to forceful interference by one state into internal affairs of the other under the pretext of protecting the rights of its citizens”; see his “Dvostoronnii uhody, scho sprimovani na vyrishennia pyt’an hromadianstva,” Bizhentsi ta mihratsia: Ukrainskyi chasopys prava i polityky 1:2 (1797): 16–19.
52. For a review of Russian’s policy on dual citizenship in the 1990s, see Igor Zevelev, Russia and Its New Diasporas (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 132–42.
ticular the Communists, could no longer count on a sufficient number of deputies to support provisions that they favored.

A tipping of the political forces in the parliament towards the national position had occurred by mid-1996, and has not tipped back since, as events around the 1997 and the 2001 revisions of the citizenship law show. The first reading of the 1997 citizenship law took place on 30 October 1996. The new draft, prepared by the interministerial working group and the presidential administration, did not retain the provision on the possibility of dual citizenship by bilateral agreement. During parliamentary debates, Communists raised the issue of dual citizenship, but this issue received far less attention than in 1991. The unambiguous constitutional provision on single citizenship was used as a legal argument against dual citizenship. One deputy of the Progressive Socialist party questioned the validity of the constitutional argument, which sparked some debate during the second reading of the law on 27 February 1997, but when the single citizenship clause in Article 1 was put to a roll-call vote it immediately passed. The national position prevailed easily in 1997, and dual citizenship has not been an issue of any prominence since. The citizenship law of January 2001 put the issue to rest. Only one parliamentarian even raised the issue of dual citizenship during the first reading of the law on 18 May 2000, and he was ignored. The law was adopted in first reading on 18 May 2000 by a clear majority (272 out of 391 present). On 18 January 2001, the law was passed by a constitutional majority (374 in favor, none against, 64 did not vote), and virtually without debate, in the second and final reading.

53. Based on Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, Komisia z pytany praw liudyny, natsionalnykh men-

The 2001 citizenship law addressed still-outstanding and rather nuanced legal problems related to citizenship acquisition stemming from the single citizenship principle as stipulated in the 1997 law. The confirmation of single citizenship further realized the national position on citizenship. The 2001 law explicitly defined “single citizenship,” not spelled out in earlier laws. Article 2 of the 2001 law stipulates that single citizenship means two things. First, if a Ukrainian citizen acquires another citizenship, in the citizen’s relations to the Ukrainian state, he or she is recognized only as a citizen of Ukraine. Second, “internal citizenship” of Ukraine’s administrative regions is not allowed. These two stipulations countered existing and potential regional and supranational challenges to the national stand on citizenship. The first addresses the possibility that Russia might exert pressure on Ukraine under the guise of protecting its citizens. Drafters of the citizenship law were aware that many citizens of Ukraine were in possession of passports of other states, including Russia. By recognizing such persons only as Ukrainian citizens in relation to the Ukrainian state, the 2001 citizenship law preempted the possibility that other states would exert pressure on Ukraine under the guise of protecting foreign citizens on its territory. The second stipulation preempted regional initiatives. In the first half of the 1990s, Crimean politicians tried (and failed) to introduce Crimean citizenship. The 2001 citizenship law discourages such attempts by de-legitimizing them a priori.

56. The language requirement of citizenship is less rigid than hard national parties had desired, but there is nevertheless a language requirement. Although proposals by these parties to privilege “ethnic Ukrainians” from other countries in citizenship acquisition failed, a territorial substitute aids people who were born (or whose relatives were born) on territories of what are defined as historical Ukrainian states. This compromise not only de facto aids ethnic Ukrainians, it recognizes the historicity of the Ukrainian state.
57. The Crimean Constitution adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in December 1998 does not provide for Crimean citizenship, although such a provision was present in earlier drafts of the Crimean Constitution. See Natalya Belits, “The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement” (paper presented at the CREES workshop, University of Birmingham, England, 10 March 2000).
Conclusion

What then do these trends bode for the nation and nation-building in Ukraine? From the outset, the nation was seen best defined in terms of nation-building. As neither ethnic nor language self-identifications were coterminous with political loyalty, the recommended way to measure nationality was by studies of attitudes towards the national state. Ukrainian citizens are seen as national or non-national in their expressed attitudes towards the existing Ukrainian state. This distinction between national and non-national was easily applied to Ukrainian political parties. As seen above, on certain issues, universally regarded as critical to the future of the state, certain groups were national, and others non-national. Because Ukrainian politicians know that ethnic and linguistic self-identifications are subject to politics, over the last 10 years they have vigorously contested the politics of nation-building and nation-destroying. This latter term is just as applicable as the former, since the issue was whether there will be a Ukrainian political community that supports a Ukrainian state.

Ukrainian politicians see policy questions such as state language and dual citizenship not as changing the momentary behavior of individuals, but as structuring the long-term choices of Ukraine’s citizens, Ukraine’s regions, and Ukraine’s Russian neighbor. Whether or not politicians or parties wished to preserve the state or destroy it, the political class as a whole accepted the importance of these policies. In this way, Ukrainian politics confirms the salience of our definition of nationality as a matter of loyalty to the state. The definition adopted above for scholarly clarity seems justified by the rough and tumble of the last decade of Ukrainian politics. Throughout, we have noted signs that, on this definition of national identity, Ukrainian nation-building has seen some successes. There is some evidence that the Ukrainian citizenry has shifted towards the national view that Ukrainian should be the only state language, and good reason to conclude that the non-national initiative of dual citizenship has disappeared from Ukrainian politics. Ukraine has also seen shifts from soft to hard national politics, and from non-national to national positions, among its political forces.
To be sure, a comparison with some of Ukraine’s western neighbors would be misplaced. The Ukrainian transformation seems to operate on a different time scale, of decades or perhaps generations. As has been shown, nation-building and, thus, the nation itself have a lot to do with time and duration. Much has been made in the literature on nationalism of the importance of the past. In Ukraine, the past is most relevant to non-national parties and non-national populations. If national identity is defined as political loyalty to a nation-state, it requires imagining and endorsing a future in which that state prospers. In this sense, which seems the most relevant one, the progress of Ukrainian nation-building has been far greater than is generally recognized.